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 Nudges for Health Policy: Effectiveness and 
Limitations 
Victoria A. Shaffer*  
I. THE PROBLEM 
The United States spends a far greater proportion of its income on 
healthcare than other high-income nations, but we get less benefit for our ef-
forts.1  The United States has poor health outcomes including the lowest life 
expectancy at birth, the highest rate of infant mortality, and much higher rates 
of obesity and other chronic diseases compared to our peer nations.2  Our 
healthcare system is also typified by inequalities.3  Health outcomes vary con-
siderably by income as well as race and ethnicity.4  And, at the end of 2015, 
our country had approximately twenty-eight and a half million uninsured non-
elderly Americans.5 
One tool that our government can use to combat these challenges is the 
use of health policy in the form of programs, regulations, and agencies that are 
aimed at improving the overall health and welfare of Americans.6  Of the var-
ious approaches to shaping health policy, this paper will focus on the use of 
“nudges,” a behavioral strategy for shaping human behavior from the frame-
work, Libertarian Paternalism.  In this Article, a nudge is defined as any aspect 
of choice architecture or any method of structuring the choice environment that 
influences behavior in a predictable way, with the restriction that this tool may 
not constrain or remove choices nor can it significantly increase the cost asso-
ciated with any of the options.  This definition is largely consistent with the 
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 1. DAVID SQUIRES & CHLOE ANDERSON, U.S. HEALTH CARE FROM A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE: SPENDING, USE OF SERVICES, PRICES, AND HEALTH IN 13 COUNTRIES 2, 
7 (2015), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-
brief/2015/oct/1819_squires_us_hlt_care_global_perspective_oecd_intl_brief_v3.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 7–9. 
 3. Raj Chetty et al., The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the 
United States, 2001–2014, 315 JAMA 1750, 1763 (2016); David R. Williams & Ronald 
Wyatt, Racial Bias in Health Care and Health: Challenges and Opportunities, 314 
JAMA 555, 555–56 (2015). 
 4. Chetty et al., supra note 3, at 1762–63; Williams & Wyatt, supra note 3, at 
555–56. 
 5. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEY FACTS ABOUT THE UNINSURED 
POPULATION 1 (2016), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Fact-Sheet-Key-Facts-about-the-
Uninsured-Population. 
 6. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 159–82 (2008). 
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original conception by Thaler and Sunstein.7  This work was informed by the 
author’s participation in the Behavioral Science & Policy Association working 
group on the application of insights from behavioral economics to health and 
healthcare.  The working group produced a report, jointly commissioned by the 
Behavioral Science and Policy Association and the White House Social and 
Behavioral Sciences Team, that identified opportunities for federal-level be-
havioral policy interventions to improve the health and well-being of Ameri-
cans.8 
II.   HEALTH POLICY ≠ OTHER POLICY DOMAINS 
Before examining the evidence for the effectiveness of nudges in health 
policy, it is important to discuss the ways in which health policy differs from 
other policy domains.  First, there are unique economic and political forces that 
shape the health policy landscape.9  Second, health policy is aimed at address-
ing complex health behaviors that are rooted in American culture and are an 
integral part of societal interactions (e.g., eating, drinking, recreational drug 
use).10  Changing these types of deeply entrenched behaviors requires health 
policies that are comprehensive and multidimensional.11  Such an approach 
may include the coordinated implementation of traditional economic policies 
(e.g., taxes) alongside behaviorally informed strategies (e.g., nudges).12  For 
example, a historical look at the rates of smoking in the United States reveals 
that smoking declined substantially with the combined dispensation of taxes, 
restrictions on advertising, and public smoking bans.13  Thus, although nudges 
have had profound successes in other domains (e.g., automatic enrollment has 
increased the amount of retirement savings), it is unlikely that nudges in health 
policy will produce similar singular successes.14 
III.   EFFECTIVENESS OF NUDGES AS HEALTH POLICY TOOLS 
In this section, I review research that provides examples of effective 
nudges in health-related domains.  However, I want to clarify that the intent of 
this manuscript is not to advocate for nudges as the panacea for our country’s 
systemic health issues.  Rather, the vision is more simply that nudges will be 
one of several tools available in the health policy toolbox.  In this Article, I do 
not provide an exhaustive review of the efficacy of nudges for all areas of  
 7. See id. at 6. 
 8. See George Loewenstein et al., A Behavioral Blueprint for Improving Health 
Care Policy, 3 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & POL. 53 (2017). 
 9. See id. at 55. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. at 53. 
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health and health behavior.  Rather, I summarize research from three areas 
where nudges have been successful in improving health or optimizing the 
healthcare system. 
A. Promotion of Healthy Eating 
The first area in which nudges have demonstrated successful use is in the 
promotion of healthy eating, which refers to either decreasing the overall ca-
loric consumption or increasing the amount of healthy food consumed.15  One 
particularly successful nudge in this area is the strategically designed cafete-
ria.16  The bulk of this research has been done in school cafeterias with elemen-
tary-aged children or adolescents.17  There are a number of methods for design-
ing a cafeteria to promote healthy eating, including placing fresh fruit next to 
the cash register for convenience and to increase the health of impulse buys.18  
Choice architects have also focused on the order that food is presented in the 
cafeteria lunch line.19  Placing the healthiest foods at the beginning of the lunch 
line or in front of less healthy choices encourages children to begin filling their 
plates with more healthy choices, leaving less room for the less healthy desserts 
or junk foods at the end of the line.20 
Trayless dining is a second method of organizing the choice environment 
to encourage better food choices.21  By simply eliminating trays, people can 
buy only what they can carry, which is typically a plate of food and a drink.22  
Structuring the environment in these ways decreases the likelihood of food 
waste,23 although this may actually result in less healthy eating.24  Finally, the 
 
 15. See Andrew S. Hanks, David R. Just & Brian Wansink, Smarter Lunchrooms 
Can Address New School Lunchroom Guidelines and Childhood Obesity, 162 J. 
PEDIATRICS 867, 868 (2013). 
 16. Id. at 867. 
 17. See id.; see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 1–2 (exemplifying how 
choice architecture can be employed in a school cafeteria). 
 18. Hanks, Just & Wansink, supra note 15, at 868. 
 19. Juliana F.W. Cohen et al., Effects of Choice Architecture and Chef-Enhanced 
Meals on the Selection and Consumption of Healthier School Foods: A Randomized 
Clinical Trial, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 431, 432 (2015). 
 20. See id. at 432, 436; Mitesh S. Patel & Kevin G. Volpp, Nudging Students To-
ward Healthier Food Choices – Applying Insights from Behavioral Economics, 169 
JAMA PEDIATRICS 425, 425–26 (2015). 
 21. Krisha Thiagarajah & Victoria M. Getty, Impact on Plate Waste of Switching 
from a Tray to a Trayless Delivery System in a University Dining Hall and Employee 
Response to the Switch, 113 J. ACAD. NUTRITION & DIETETICS 141, 141 (2013). 
 22. See id. at 143–44. 
 23. Id. at 143. 
 24. Brian Wansink & David R. Just, Trayless Cafeterias Lead Diners to Take Less 
Salad and Relatively More Dessert, 18 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 1535, 1535–36 (2013). 
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shapes and sizes of packaging and plates themselves have been used to de-
crease consumption.25  One fairly robust finding is that larger containers lead 
to more food consumed, while smaller containers result in less food con-
sumed,26 even when the food being consumed is undesirable.  Further, wide or 
large serving containers (e.g., glasses, plates) affect the perception about the 
amount of food consumed.27  When drinking liquids, people typically judge the 
amount consumed by how much the height of the liquid decreases without tak-
ing the width of the glass into account.28  People consume more liquid when 
given short, wide glasses than when drinking out of tall, narrow glasses.29  
Therefore, you can easily manipulate the food environment at your dinner table 
to nudge the desired consumption behavior.  If you want your child to drink 
more milk, serve it a short, fat glass, but if you want your friend to drink less 
beer, serve it in a tall, skinny glass.  In all of these examples, people can be 
nudged into changing their eating or drinking behaviors through a simple 
change of the environment. 
B. Overutilization in Healthcare 
A second area in which nudges have been effective is decreasing overuti-
lization in healthcare.30  For example, it has long been recognized that the pre-
scription of antibiotics for viral infections is ineffective and potentially danger-
ous for individual and public health.31  If a patient is prescribed an antibiotic 
for symptoms that are likely viral in nature (e.g., persistent cough, conjunctivi-
tis), their symptoms will not improve by taking an antibiotic, and they may 
potentially experience side effects such as gastrointestinal symptoms/condi-
tions (e.g., diarrhea or C. difficile) or contraception failure.32  Perhaps more 
importantly, prescribing antibiotics for viruses can lead to the development of 
antibiotic resistant strains of bacteria.33  Despite these negative consequences, 
clinicians still routinely prescribe antibiotics for symptoms that are likely 
 
 25. Brian Wansink & Junyong Kim, Bad Popcorn in Big Buckets: Portion Size 
Can Influence Intake as Much as Taste, 37 J. NUTRITION EDUC. & BEHAV. 242, 242–
44 (2005). 
 26. Id. at 244. 
 27. Brian Wansink, Environmental Factors That Increase the Food Intake and 
Consumption Volume of Unknowing Consumers, 24 ANN. REV. NUTRITION 455, 468–
69 (2004); Wansink & Kim, supra note 25, at 244. 
 28. Wansink, supra note 27, at 468–69. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Daniella Meeker et al., Effect of Behavioral Interventions on Inappropri-
ate Antibiotic Prescribing Among Primary Care Practices: A Randomized Clinical 
Trial, 315 JAMA 562 (2016). 
 31. Id. at 563. 
 32. Antibiotics Aren’t Always the Answer, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/features/getsmart/ (last updated Nov. 14, 2016). 
 33. Meeker et al., supra note 30, at 563. 
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caused by a virus.34  In an attempt to reduce overprescribing of antibiotics, 
Meeker and colleagues have employed a type of nudge called an “accountable 
justification.”35 
Imagine that a physician decides to order an antibiotic for a patient who 
has had a cough for a few weeks, which is now starting to worsen.  The physi-
cian may be concerned that a secondary bacterial infection has developed in 
addition to the virus and want to prescribe an antibiotic to treat the patient.  
However, under this program, this specific combination of diagnosis (e.g., non-
specific upper respiratory tract infection) and prescription drug order (e.g., an-
tibiotic) is flagged in the electronic health record.36  Therefore, when a physi-
cian decides to prescribe an antibiotic for this patient, they are prompted to 
provide a brief rationale for this decision.37  Note that this nudge, like the food 
interventions described above, neither constrains choice nor significantly alters 
the cost of prescribing an antibiotic.38  Physicians are still able to prescribe 
these medications after providing a short justification for their use.  While an 
extremely low-cost intervention, these types of nudges have been wildly suc-
cessful.39  In one recent study, the use of an accountable justification program 
reduced the rates of antibiotic prescriptions for antibiotic-inappropriate diag-
noses from 23.2% to 5.2% over eighteen months.40 
Another type of nudge that has been effective at reducing overutilization 
in healthcare is the required second opinion.41  Second opinions can also be 
employed to reduce the use of tests and procedures with questionable benefit, 
including screening tests for some cancers.42  In the United States, the U.S. 
Preventative Services Task Force (“USPSTF”), an independent committee of 
national experts in preventative and evidence-based medicine, was created in 
1984 to review clinical evidence and make written recommendations about the 
use of preventive health services (e.g., screenings and medications).43  These 
recommendations are accompanied by a letter grade (A, B, C, D, or I) that 
symbolizes the quality of evidence for the recommendation and the ratio of 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 564. 
 36. Id. at 563–64. 
 37. Id. at 564. 
 38. Id. at 569. 
 39. See id. at 564, 566. 
 40. Id. at 565. 
 41. Fernando Althabe et al., Mandatory Second Opinion to Reduce Rates of Un-
necessary Caesarean Sections in Latin America: A Cluster Randomised Controlled 
Trial, 363 LANCET 1934, 1938 (2004). 
 42. See Final Recommendation Statement: Prostate Cancer: Screening, U.S. 
PREVENTATIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE, https://www.uspreventiveservicestask-
force.org/Page/Document/RecommendationStatementFinal/prostate-cancer-screening 
(last updated May 2012). 
 43. About the USPSTF, U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE, 
https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/about-the-uspstf (last up-
dated May 2017). 
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benefits to harms for a particular preventive service.44  In the academic health 
community, these recommendations are treated as the gold standard for deter-
mining the public health value of specific preventive services.45  After review-
ing the evidence based on the effectiveness of various screening tests, some 
screening tests have received a poor grade from the USPSTF.46 
For example, the USPSTF gave prostate-specific antigen screening for 
prostate cancer a “D,” indicating that providers should discourage the use of 
this test to screen for prostate cancer in practice.47  In addition, the USPSTF 
gave the use of mammograms to screen for breast cancer in women ages forty 
to forty-nine a “C,” which indicates that there is likely only a small net benefit 
to this service.48  Its use should be based on a collaborative decision between 
doctors and their patients after an informed discussion about the benefits (e.g., 
possible early detection of cancer) and harms (e.g., high false positive rate) of 
undergoing screening.49  Based on these recommendations, nudges, in the form 
of requiring second opinions to undergo screening for these tests, could be em-
ployed to reduce the use of these tests.  Like other nudges, requiring a second 
opinion does not constrain choice, although it does place a somewhat greater 
burden on the cost of screening through the time and potential money required 
to get a second opinion.  In the United States, policies of this type are highly 
politicized and have been labeled as “rationing healthcare.”50  However, man-
datory second opinions have been successfully employed in other countries, 
reducing use of the desired test or procedure.51 
C. Decreasing Costs of Healthcare 
Finally, nudges have also been effective tools for decreasing healthcare 
costs.  For example, the strategic selection of default settings within the elec-
tronic health record (“EHR”) is one method of nudging physicians toward more 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Nelson E. Canter, Legal Implications for Failure to Screen for Colorectal 
Cancer, 39 WESTCHESTER B.J. 9, 10 (2014) (referring to USPTF as “practice guidelines 
which are authoritative practice guidelines to be followed in the medical field”). 
 46. See, e.g., Final Recommendation Statement: Prostate Cancer: Screening, su-
pra note 42. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Final Recommendation Statement: Breast Cancer: Screening, U.S. 
PREVENTATIVE SERVICES TASK FORCE, https://www.uspreventiveservicestask-
force.org/Page/Document/RecommendationStatementFinal/breast-cancer-screening1 
(last updated Jan. 2016). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Robert Pearl, Why Healthcare Rationing Is a Growing Reality for Americans, 
FORBES (Feb. 2, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rob-
ertpearl/2017/02/02/why-healthcare-rationing-is-a-growing-reality-for-ameri-
cans/#5c36a4152dba. 
 51. Althabe et al., supra note 41, at 1934–40. 
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cost-effective practices.52  Within an EHR, defaults often take the form of an 
item (test, medication, order, etc.) that has been preselected, based on some 
predetermined criteria, from a larger list of available choices.53  Defaults 
should be chosen carefully because they can have an important impact on be-
havior.54  For example, when completing medication orders for patients, one 
way to manipulate the default setting is to preselect the generic version of the 
drug when there are multiple options (including generic and name brand med-
ications).55  In this case, the default functions as a nudge because it gently re-
minds physicians of the generic option but does not constrain choice.  The pro-
vider is free to order any medication; they only need to deselect the generic 
drug and select instead the desired medication.  Nudges of this type have been 
incredibly successful at increasing the ratio of generic to name brand prescrip-
tions.56  Recent work by Malhotra and colleagues described large and sustained 
increases in the proportion of generic medications ordered after a drug-pre-
scribing interface redesign that featured a generic drug default.57  Specifically, 
the authors reported that the proportion of generic drugs prescribed increased 
from approximately forty percent to ninety-six percent after the implementa-
tion of this technology-based nudge.58 
Additionally, nudges that promote the use of patient decision aids for 
treatments with uncertain benefit have led patients to opt for less invasive treat-
ments over surgical interventions, resulting in a significant decrease in costs 
associated with treatment.59  Patient decision aids are tools to provide patients 
with balanced evidence about their options for treatment when the decision is 
preference sensitive or when there is clinical equipoise.60  In these cases, there 
is no single, dominant evidence-based treatment; therefore, individual deci-
sions are based on the patient’s preferences for care and the weight they place 
on the benefits and harms of treatment.61  For example, treatments for low back 
 
 52. See C. Adam Probst & Victoria A. Shaffer, The Effect of Defaults in an Elec-
tronic Health Record on Laboratory Test Ordering Practices for Pediatric Patients, 32 
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 995 (2013). 
 53. See id. at 996. 
 54. See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics and the Re-
tirement Savings Crisis, 339 SCIENCE 1152, 1152–53 (finding that the percentage of 
U.S. employers that offer 401(k) plans that automatically enroll employees escalates 
savings rates). 
 55. Sameer Malhotra et al., Effects of an E-prescribing Interface Redesign on 
Rates of Generic Drug Prescribing: Exploiting Default Options, 23 J. AM. MED. INFO. 
ASS’N. 891, 891 (2016). 
 56. Id. at 894. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 895. 
 59. David Arterburn et al., Introducing Decision Aids at Group Health Was Linked 
to Sharply Lower Hip and Knee Surgery Rates and Costs, 31 HEALH AFF. 2094, 2094 
(2012). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
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pain and knee pain typically involve noninvasive treatment options, such as 
physical therapy, diet, and exercise, or elective surgery.62  Comparative effec-
tiveness studies have revealed that the two treatments result in similar out-
comes, leaving patients to weigh the pros and cons of each choice.63  Addition-
ally complicating the decision landscape is the fact that subspecialties often 
disagree about which approach to recommend (e.g., surgeons recommend sur-
gery; primary care providers recommend behavioral alternatives).64  Therefore, 
the use of patient decision aids represents an important unbiased informational 
tool that can help patients make treatment choices that better match their pref-
erences for care.65 
However, when patients are given decision aids for preference-sensitive 
decisions, they show an increased preference for the noninvasive treatment.66  
Arterburn and colleagues reported that introducing decision aids in a large 
healthcare system reduced hip replacements by twenty-six percent and knee 
replacements by thirty-eight percent, ultimately lowering costs twelve to 
twenty-one percent over six months.67  It is worth emphasizing that the required 
use of patient decision aids to inform decision making still clearly fits within 
the parameters of a nudge, where patient choice is ultimately unconstrained 
(patients may opt for behavioral or surgical interventions).  However, the un-
derlying premise is that when given a choice, most people prefer to avoid sur-
gery when possible.68  This preference will ultimately lead to fewer surgeries 
because patients have historically been poorly informed about their choices.69  
Recently several states have addressed the use of patient decision aids by in-
troducing laws that either mandate or incentivize shared decision making 
through high-quality decision aids.70 
The use of nudges in health information technology has become an in-
creasingly popular tool due in part to the HITECH Act (Health Information 
 
 62. See id. at 2094, 2101. 
 63. See id. at 2094–95. 
 64. See John D. Birkmeyer et al., Understanding of Regional Variation in the Use 
of Surgery, 382 LANCET 1121, 1123 (2013); see also Floyd J. Fowler, Jr. et al., 
Comparison of Recommendations by Urologists and Radiation Oncologists for 
Treatment of Clinically Localized Prostate Cancer, 283 JAMA 3217, 3217 (2000) 
(concluding that “specialists overwhelmingly recommend the therapy that they 
themselves deliver”). 
 65. See Dawn Stacey et al., Decision Aids for People Facing Health Treatment or 
Screening Decisions, 4 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS. 28 (2017). 
 66. Id. at 29. 
 67. Arterburn et al., supra note 59, at 2100. 
 68. See id. at 2094–95. 
 69. Annette M. O’Connor et al., Toward the ‘Tipping Point’: Decision Aids and 
Informed Patient Choice, 26 HEALTH AFF. 716, 717 (2007). 
 70. See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Certified Patient Decision Aids: Solving 
Persistent Problems with Informed Consent Law, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 12 (2017) 
(discussing “right to know” legislation across several states and in a variety of medical 
contexts, including Washington’s efforts to certify high-quality decision aids). 
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Technology for Economic and Clinical Health), Title XIII of the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.71  This legislation established incentive 
payments to accelerate the “meaningful use” of health information technology, 
which encourages the use of technology to improve the quality and safety of 
healthcare and to engage patients and their families.72  Nudges are one im-
portant method of meeting the meaningful use criteria and can be integrated 
into EHRs in the form of defaults, accountable justification, second opinions, 
and the automatic delivery of patient decision aids.  In addition to promoting 
healthy eating, reducing overutilization of healthcare, and reducing cost, 
nudges have the potential to be a useful tool in shaping additional behaviors 
such as health insurance enrollment, disease and lifestyle management, and ad-
vance care planning. 
IV.  DIFFICULTY STUDYING NUDGES IN HEALTH 
Although nudges have had significant successes in these areas, it is ex-
tremely important to continue empirically testing the efficacy of new nudges.  
The field has not been sufficiently explored to warrant the implementation of 
new nudge-based policies without data to support policy effectiveness.  Poli-
cies about organ donation provide a case study on the consequences of adopting 
nudges as policy without sufficient data.  Initially, interest around the impact 
of nudges on organ donation was heightened after a seminal paper by Johnson 
and Goldstein,73 which discussed the association between a country’s default 
policy for organ donation and the rates of organ donation in that country.  The 
paper compared the organ donation rates of countries with an opt-in policy (by 
default people in these countries were not organ donors but could opt in if de-
sired) to those of countries with an opt-out policy (citizens in these countries 
were automatically organ donors unless they chose to opt out) and reported that 
rates of organ donation were dramatically higher in opt-out countries (~90%) 
than opt-in countries (~10%).74  On the basis of this work, which was largely 
focused on policy-level analyses and thought experiments, many U.S. states 
have changed their organ donation registration processes.75  However, no ex-
periments had been conducted on actual organ donation registration data.  A 
recent working paper produced by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
examined organ donation rates in the state of California after it moved from an 
opt-in program to an “active choice” program.76  An active choice program  
 71. Bradford William Hesse et al., Nudging Best Practice: The HITECH Act and 
Behavioral Medicine, 1 TRANSLATIONAL BEHAV. MED. 175 (2011). 
 72. See id. at 176. 
 73. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 
1338 (2003). 
 74. Id. at 1338. 
 75. Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, Don’t Take ‘No’ for an Answer: An Experi-
ment with Actual Organ Donor Registrations 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 20,378, 2014). 
 76. Id. at 2, 7. 
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requires people to directly answer the question, “Do you want to be an organ 
donor?,” with a “yes” or “no.”  Despite high hopes for the active choice para-
digm, switching did not increase the number of people who chose to be organ 
donors in the state of California.77  In contrast, there is some evidence that the 
active choice programs may actually result in a decrease in organ donation 
rates, underscoring the importance of continued research efforts to inform pol-
icy.78 
Despite the need for research-based health policy, it is quite difficult in 
practice to conduct randomized field studies on health topics given the layers 
of privacy protections around personal health data.  Therefore, to extend the 
depth and breadth of research on health policy, there is an urgent need to: 1) 
clarify rules governing the ability of firms and public agencies to conduct field 
studies and 2) grant regulatory exceptions when warranted.  Although this may 
seem like governmental overreach, there is precedent for relaxing privacy pro-
tections around personal data to inform policy.  The Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau, a government agency created in 2008 to monitor the financial 
marketplace with the goal of protecting consumers, has the authority to grant 
regulatory exceptions to firms to facilitate research on consumer protection.79  
To employ nudges as effective and efficient tools in our health policy toolbox, 
real world data and field experiments are required elements of the policy de-
velopment process. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Nudges will not be a salve for the myriad of health-related issues facing 
the United States today.  However, nudges are one tool that can have a major 
impact on health behavior when used in a targeted fashion.  Nudges, in the 
form of accountable justifications, defaults, and choice architecture, are effec-
tive methods of increasing desired health behaviors and improving adherence 
to clinical guidelines.  To date, nudges have been used to promote healthy eat-
ing, reduce overutilization of healthcare, and decrease healthcare costs.  
Nudge-based health policies are also likely to grow in popularity, particularly 
in the context of EHRs.  There are currently incentives for promoting mean-
ingful use of the health information technologies, and nudges represent a sim-
ple way to meet the meaningful use criteria. 
While nudges have effectively shaped health behavior in some areas, we 
must continue to evaluate the effectiveness of nudges by granting access to 
health data and enabling continued evidence-based assessment of nudge-based 
health policies.  Finally, given that the problems facing the health of our nation 
are multi-faceted and complex, they will only be adequately addressed through 
multidimensional and comprehensive approaches to health policy combining 
both traditional economic policies and behaviorally informed strategies. 
 
 77. Id. at 7–10. 
 78. Id. at 10. 
 79. Loewenstein et al., supra note 8, at 61–62. 
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